and how russians are using echnology tools to exponentially increase the ower of their fake news.

you've cited reports at least 8% of twitter accounts are bot accounts and don't represent an actual person. was out recently with facebook and they took down accounts. facebook acted like they had no responsibility for policing fake news. i think they moved into a more responsible position. i'd love to hear from all of you what role you feel these platform companies that control so much information, google, face boork, twitter, et al, have in this new world. we'll go down the list, ambassador burns. ambassador burns: i was impressed with the number of people, take youtube, for example, they now dedicate to try to filter out hate speech and that's commendable.

if that's the case, there ought to be an ongoing dialogue between the u.s. government, our national security agencies and these companies to try to filter out russia propaganda. it's a direct assault on our country. i was impressed by his testimony. i thought it was quite convincing there has to be an integration of a technology company and our government on this issue. senator warner: thank you. i'd love to hear the rest of your comments, please. came l, first, i also back from silicon valley where we talked to a lot of these companies on these issues. first, there is a growing market, black market for robotics in social media. some of it is rather innocent but much of it is some kind of criminal activity. and that is going to be a growing concern for people in a digital environment to actually understand that they're really interacting with a human being instead of large numbers of

robots supported by artificial intelligence. to counter that, these companies that have these platforms are one of the key players. i was heartened by the discussion back there. they are taking it seriously. mr. sarts: it's probably slightly too late but most of these big companies are investing on thinking about how they can be an active supporter of a democratic process, not a disruptor, and secondly, there is a growing number of the technology research on the subject that we can rely on. as ambassador burns said and as i said in my initial statement, it is a must we work together. if we don't we will not succeed in the digital environment. senator warner: have we seen this in germany?

>> yes. we have talked to the big media companies like google, facebook and twitter. i have been told the initial conversations were less than, shall we say, less than cooperative. there seem to be no inclination to self-police and there also was no inclination to help. that has significantly changed, i gather. now, the german justice minister has just put out a draft of a law called -- we use to annoy things people. hate speech in germany is quite strong, obviously with roots in our history. i and others have mixed feelings about this. i would quite like the political marketplace to regulate itself. . stelzenmueller: very

powerful actors that control algorithms that can control the marketplace without citizens noticing that, if they refuse to self-police i believe such laws need to become necessary. we need to see where responsibility for regulation properly lies. >> thank you. ambassador burns, you know, we're pretty used to dealing with hyperbole on this committee with the things we hear. i want to talk about your statement that russia is the most dangerous adversary we have. senator risch: if you said i am not sure you would reach this conclusion, i'm sure a lot of us what we hear what's going on in north korea and some of our other adversaries that russia certainly is a dangerous adversary but when you have someone running a country like

kim jong un and with what we know about what he's probably going to do if his -- if his administration is threatened, i got to tell you that i -- you might be slightly off mark when you say russia's the most dangerous adversary that we face but don't take that as a criticism. think -- when i say i russia is not a dangerous adversary. i would just caution it falls with a group of countries and there's others that are more dangerous. you were -- you were critical of -- are critical of president trump and what he's thinking right now. you would agree with me that the russians have taken no active measures in an election while donald trump has been president, is that a fair statement? senator burns: senator, thank you. may i respond, i agree

everything you said about north korea but russia can do greater damage to us. from a nuclear weapons perspective. and certainly in trying to draw a new dividing line in europe. so it's a respectful sagreement. disagreement. senator risch: i appreciate that. and let me ask you this. do you think it's more likely that that would come -- assuming north korea had nuclear weapons they could deliver, is it more likely that it would come from russia or north korea? ambassador burns: the threat from russia is multifaceted. it's not just from nuclear weapons. senator risch: no question about that. ambassador burns: i think they are both a problem, a big problem for the united states. i was echoing general dunford when he was confirmed. senator risch: back to my last question. you would agree that the russians have no active measure while donald trump has been president? ambassador burns: i don't know. we've had congressional elections.

senator risch: and you think the russians have taken aggressive measures in those elections? mbassador burns: i don't know. senator risch: we know they did in the last election. we are all in agreement with that. who was president of the united states when that occurred? ambassador burns: that was president obama. senator rish: he has admitted he talked to mr. putin about that, is that correct? ambassador burns: so, you heard my testimony about president obama. great respect for president obama. this was a difficult decision. i think that president obama with the benefit of hindsight should have acted more resolutely, quickly, to be transparent with the american people. did he take action. what disturbs me about president trump is that he's not investigating, has taken no action. senator risch: got that. i'm talking about somebody that could have done something about this while it was going on. you are aware that president

obama talked to mr. putin about that, are you not, in the sum irof 2016? ambassador burns: that's what the news reports say. i also know the obama administration briefed the eight senior members of congress early on. there were public statements made by jeh johnson on october 7. they did take action. it's not as if the obama administration just was silent on this issue. senator risch: indeed, when mr. -- when president obama told mr. putin that we knew that they were taking active measures, that was a class -- that was classified information, was it not? ambassador burns: i think if you are the president of the united states, and you're trying to deliver a stiff diplomatic mission, you are well -- that's the object of the conversation. senator risch: couldn't agree more. that's the purpose of classified information. no good if you collect it and don't use it. ambassador burns: not always. sometimes you don't want that information to see the light of

day. senator risch: what else should president obama have done? ambassador burns: this is monday morning quarterbacking by me. i appreciate the fact he finally did action on the sanctions. if you go back and look at it, the american people, in my judgment, deserve to know what was happening, clearly, after ringing the village bell. we should have had a more immediate response that was painful to the russians. whether that was immediate sanctions or some type of offensive action we could have taken by covert means against them. so i think there were a variety of options. i wasn't there so i don't want to micromanage this. i do think he could have done more. my testimony clearly shows that president trump has taken no action whatsoever. i think that's irresponsible. senator risch: got that. the description you gave, you would agree with me, that the obama administration did not take significant -- the significant action needed, including informing the american people, which would have gone a

long way to countering what the russians did, fair statement? ambassador burns: well, i think the obama administration should have taken greater action, but the more pertinent question today is what our current president is not doing. that has implications for europe and they are negative. senator risch: to you it's more important. to me it was what should have been done by the commander in chief at the time. chairman burr: senator feinstein. senator feinstein: many have said this is actually the crime of the century. if you think about it, it is. if you think about the fact that it's conducted by intelligence agencies, we know russian intelligence to be relentless and ruthless. and it all happened and it contributed toward the defeat of an american presidential candidate who happened to be the first woman running for that

office. well, that's not true. but in a very serious and electable way it is. they targeted 21 states. they went into 21 states. i have been sitting here listening to you, listening to your colleagues. have great respect for you. fact, view is that if, in this is the crime of the century , if, in fact, it's going to lead to other crimes being committed in the future, that we together have a responsibility to hit back. the question comes, are sanctions really the effective way to do it? or do we do it in the cyberworld? but i don't think that we can sit here and see the amount of

destruction that has been done, the defeat of a candidate, the intrusion into 21 state systems. the continuation even now with spear phishing. what's happening in europe and the iron bear is on a march. how do you stop that? nd we have had certain abilities discussed of how to develop a hit back, and it's hard for me to believe that sanctions make them angry, but sanctions don't really do anything. there is a downside to a cyberwar. on the other hand, the united states of america cannot see the critical infrastructure of an american democratic election

destroyed by russia. i would be very interested if anyone would be prepared to talk about what europe and america could do together to plan, to repare, and to hit back. ambassador burns: senator i would say briefly. our sanctions have to be alined. they would be stronger if we work together with the europeans to align what they do with sanctions with us, number one. number two, it's my impression we can do much more in a way of intelligence but also an active work together to respond verbally to the propaganda. but number three, i think you're right and i so testified that we have to think of other means. and we have capacity that if we wanted to use it, we could. that has to be aligned with europe. senator feinstein: bear in mind

these aren't fringe people. these are at least two of the three intelligence services of russia. that's a big deal. the president of russia committed his intelligence services to hit our election ystem. do we just go, well, maybe we shut off this sanction or that sanction? maybe we think it's going to just go away? it shows no signs of going away. i have been on this committee for a long time. i have never seen a time when with full confidence every single one of america's intelligence agencies have come together and say they have had full confidence that this was orchestrated by putin and he used his intelligence services o do it. >> if i may.

first thing we have to do is cover our backs. that is building the resilience. that was the things that we talked about. senator feinstein: define resilience >> ability of the democratic process to which stands the attacks to influence the malicious intent from outside the societal choices was the election system, within the political process. director sarts: and being able to irrespective -- senator feinstein: with what act, sir? we do stand -- there is no question -- director sarts: i can go through the things i recommended. cyberdefense being on the high level. having being able to operation wise the information battle space. and many of these. secondly, i wanted to say in

fact if you look at russian documents they believe we are attacking them. and i think they really believe that. which is i think a paradox. what we have to really look for is that we're not attacked by russians, we're attacked by kremlin. what we can do is actually help also people within russia to recognize what is the actual realities. i think that is the most powerful weapon. the truth. the truth that kremlin is hiding away from their own citizens. and that is i think the weapon we have, which is the most -- senator feinstein: thank you. chairman burr: senator rubio. >> may i add a few words? i personally believe in the country which was under sanctions.

ambassador garcevic my personal experience of being a citizen of a country and living a normal life in a country under sanctions, for sanctions to start working and to start bearing fruits, you need time. it took like nine years for yugoslavia, which was smaller, smaller than russia, to see sanctions working. i can imagine in the case of ussia we have to endure, persevere, and sanctions will start bearing fruit. i don't think that we should stop or rethink this strategy. on top of it someone mentioned i think ambassador mentioned importance of nato. because nato is not only military organization. nato is security and political organization. since it was formed in 1949,

u.s. has seen nato as a pillar of euro-atlantic bond. and the countries who are members of nato are there because of their share. which means we have to keep ourselves together and strong to nato, which includes number of measures. not only deter reince, which is taking place right now in europe, but also number one -- it's not only that europe is under attack. values are under attack. values of democracy, values of parliamentary democracy, liberal democracy is under attack. russia is backing those groups in europe, leftist or rightist, those who challenge a very core values of liberal democracy. because those who challenge from within those democratic systems

and would like to see those ystem and values evolving. like a hard core or hard power measures you have to put that is also on soft power. with russia you use against the democratic systems. i think democratic systems in soft power are much better off than russia. and may offer more than russia an offer to countries. >> i would like to add small remark. dr. stelzenmueller: that is if i may say, as an ally and citizen of your ally of of over 60 years , do no harm. do not question the alliance. do not question the alliance that is greatly inure strategic interest with europe. but that is also in our interest. it is important for us.

and an american government, white house, that questions the validity of that alliance, that questions the validity of the article 5 neutral defense commitment does more to undermine our security and our safety than many things that the kremlin does. we're all vibrant western democracies. that's not to say we don't have flaws and vulnerabilities. we should not only address those but as western democracies can address them together. we can look at them together. and i would add only one thing. sanctions do work. perhaps even more as a political statement of cohesion and will. and as such they have had a tremendous impact on russia. they have left a deep impression on the kremlin. they have also done some economic damage. but they have above all been an expression of europe's and america's will to stand together against the threat towards ukraine and its neighbors and the threat against the european project and american interests there.

so they do work. thank you. chairman burr: senator rubio. senator rubio: thank you for being here. my hope is this committee's work will produce a document that doesn't simply detail what happened but how they do it so we can prevent -- take steps, prevent steps to address this in the future. i don't believe it's going away any time soon for one simple reason, it worked. a lot of people are focused on the electoral outcome. the broader design was to sow instability, chaos, divisions in a country that already had great political division. i don't think anybody can doubt that's the case. just the shear amount of time and energy that's been spent by this committee, this congress, the press, and everybody else on this issue of russia alone must be deeply gratifying to the people who authorized these measures and the way it's exacerbated our ability to get work done among other things has been impactful. i truly hope as we do our work we'll learn what are the best ways to confront it within the confines of the following. we have a first am. i understand places like france

are able to block out, when the stuff came out of macron, they had a black out at the end period. a lot of that was not widely reported. i'm not attacking the media. one of the most powerful, unwitting agents of russian influence was the mainstream media. when these emails are being leaked from wiki leaks, there was a lot of focus on what was ended. the gossipy aspects of it and not the origin of what it was about. and because it's did -- we have a first amendment in this country. the people who did this understood that certain information would get widespread coverage. i'm not advocating censorship. that's what they'll use against us. we have that difference what they have in europe anti-like. i want to know since -- what has worked? has anyone successfully confronted this threat and proven to us things you can do to alleviate the sting of these efforts? i point to an article in "the new york times" by several authors on may 9 of 2017 talks

about steps taken by macon's campaign including creating dozens of false email accounts complete with phony documents to confuse the attackers. i'm curious ambassador garcevic, about the efforts in monte neglect row, small country far closer, historical, religious ties to russia and where propaganda run rampant they were unable to persuade the people there. what works? e need to do it. ambassador garcevic first: what works is people don't like to be manipulated . when they know somebody's out there for them to change their mind and get under the skin. director sarts: they become more cautious. that's the first thing. we're seeing in a number of countries where public becomes aware, it's much harder.

like instantly, to get the facts the russians are trying to achieve. secondly, it is, i think, very awkward, especially misinformation, the macron case you know it's going to happen, you do a contingency plan. i would say your contingency is not that they are not going to break in. there is always a way through human fault you can get into the systems. you actually as they do, you do a trap. you do a trap. that's other thing that has clearly worked. at takes also the knowledge, preparation, and acceptance that it is happening. thirdly, in the fake news cycles, we have seen always that the fake news comes in first, create motion, and gets wire. if you are able to get in to hat cyber first, you are

limiting the effect if not taking it away as such. we have seen cases where the fake stories about german soldiers raping a teenage girl were trying to circulate. where the government and media actually made sure the first news ever somebody seen was their fake news. both government and the media worked their part. that never got attraction. there are quite a number of good successful tactical and strategic examples one can look at. ambassador garcevic: what was russia's goal in the region? it goes beyond mon at the neglect row -- monte neglect row. it's not only about montenegro, it's about other countries wavering.

if montenegro can be considered a lost case for russia, others are not lost case yet. and russia is trying to by making example in nontenegro is trying to signal to others, what we're willing to do, or what we can do. this is really from strategicical point of view, when this comes to this corner of europe, important for russia. when it comes to media campaign carried out in montenegro also speaks of russia has an approach, it adopted it's approach to what -- how to reach out to people there. not only there but the region. montenegro first of all we're not used to watching russian tv, reading russian newspapers in russian. we're not like people in ukraine, for example.

we don't hear russian communities living there. they therefore decided to open, establish, a number of ussia media in the region. they brought news in the local language and use local networks to republish those news. publish kate news make either fake, then those news will be broadcasted or republished by local news. then people will trust local news, local media, not russian media. constitute nick and russia today can -- spute nick and russia today can -- sputnik and russia and russia can become popular today. they effectively use church and faith. my society, traditional society,

people trust church. since we're also population. o they use church to propagate orthodox style or eastern orthodox style of life and present to the people, citizens of my country, that it's about our vanity and roots and it's about dignity. and that if in christianity is fundamentally different than western world. if we join nato, or the e.u., at the end of the day we're going to lose our identity and it's about dignity. it speaks how effectively russia uses different channels, different mechanisms, in order to reach out to people and send message which will be, how you say, in order to earn our heart of people they would like to get on their side.

chairman burr: senator wyden. senator wyden: thank you. thank the four of you. this has been a very valuable panel. here in our inquiry i focused on what i called the follow the money issues. and concerns about moscow's funding of pro-russia political is ies and groups in europe not new. two years ago they directed the national intelligence office to submit an intelligence assessment on this issue. what is different now is we're looking at this attack on european democracies to help us understand what has happened to our democracy. i want to ssarts, start with you because you have studied moscow's financing political figures. let me see if we can go through a few questions here. have you been able to determine if vladimir putin employs particular strategies to develop

relationships and curry favor with political figures in europe. if so, what would those strategies be? director sarts: first there are two strategies to insight different -- insight different political actors across europe into cooperating with russia. first is financial incentives. it can work first through the opening of business opportunities, vis-a-vis kremlin controlled companies. or it can work also through a number of funds controlled by kremlin that send in further the money to different russian controlled n.g.o.'s. and then further on,

disseminating the financial incite peoplee -- n to -- the other venue is nonfinancial which is giving the russian information power as the backdrop to whoever's message they are trying to promote and who's political point of view they are trying to use for whatever their -- senator wyden: does president putin make the decision himself to support political figures in europe, based again on what you know. director sarts: we look explicitly at the open source. so i would not be able on the -- my wealth of information to make that conclusion. senator wyden: does russian assistance to its allies in

europe involve helping political parties, individual political figures, associates of individual political figures, or all of these different approaches? director sarts: they do. senator wyden: all of the above. and is there any information available on what mechanisms mutin prefers -- putesin prefers to provide financial assistance o political figures in europe? director sarts: in an open space there have been a number of reports from the european intelligence agencies catching out with some of these die tails some of the practices. but there is much more which is not within the open public space that is known of these activities. senator wyden: one last one for you, director sarts. your statements refer to russian sishe attacks, including the

25015 russian hack of the german buddhist tag. last week the u.k. parliament came under what british call a sustain and determined attack on all parliamentary user accounts. the source of the attack has not been identified. the reason i ask is my understanding with respect to these issues is every attack is going to be different. every attack is going to be different because once you have engaged in one particular strategy, you have people preparing for that and they move on to the next. what's your advice to us based on your analysis in europe for how we deal with this extraordinarily important issue of developing cyberattack strategy, preventive cyberattack strategy? director sarts: first i think you give too much credit to the kremlin operations. much of what is said the tools remains the same. there is variations and there is

experimentation, but it is not more than the 20% of the overall activity. the american advice is that we have to think slightly differently about what the cyberattack is. we typically think of it as a venue to get into the infrastructure and get the state datea. but i would argue that we have to think of it, two parameters, technical as very important, but at the end of the day, the purpose of the attack to get into the minds. and we have to actually, employing our oath, strategies, focus both technical as well as cognitive aspect of the defense. senator wyden: my time is up. i'm glad you think the russians are less clever than cyberattackers elsewhere. i have reservations about that. i just want to make one last point. i know my time is up, mr.

chairman. ambassador burns, i'm a fan of yours. i just heard one word that concerned me with respect to the relationship of government and the technology companies. you probably didn't mean it, you talked about integrating the companies and the government. i think what you are meaning was better communication between the government and the companies. and i just wanted to make that point. thank you, mr. chairman. if you would like to respond. ambassador burns: very quickly. thank you. i meant that there should be communication not there be formally integrative efforts, thank you. chairman burr: senator collins. senator collins: ambassador burns, it's good to see you. thank you for joining this panel this morning. i'm struck as i listen to the the mony of testimony of all the witnesses that the approach that was used in montenegro, france, and germany, has been much more proactive. it's bolder, it exposes the

falsehoods that are out there. and it is a far more visible effort. ambassador, you were somewhat critical of president obama, and i would be even more critical of his response. and i would call it behind the scenes ineffective and tardy. it wasn't really until after the election that sanctions were mposed and that the january 6, 2017 report on the extensiveness and the scope of russian interference in our elections was released by the intelligence community. so there seems to me to be a big difference in the approach that's taken by our allies and the approach that was taken by president obama.

as you pointed out rightly, president trump's administration does not seem to have any strategy to deal with this going forward at this point. but then i hear about the efforts taken in france, nor example -- for example, where there was a coordinated effort among government, the media, the campaigns, and even the technology companies. and there's one headline that says, french newsrooms unite to fight election misinformation. i just can't even imagine a headline in the united states saying, american newsrooms unite to fight election misinformation. so are our systems so different that while we can learn from our allies much more successful efforts to counter russian active measures, is that even

possible in our country given the very different role of the media here? and i'm asking ambassador burns. ambassador burns: thank you, senator. i think we're learning a lesson as we go along. and i think director comey was right when the committee asked him about this that he thinks that the next target in our country could be either party. i aplayed the bipartisan effort to try to learn the lesson. the europeans have learned lessons from what went wrong in our election. what seems to have worked well in the macron campaign is speed and decisive action. and transparency. so that actually all the french people were made aware of the threat. and they have a right to that information. that was the basis of my criticism. i just want to say this. i have tremendous respect for president obama. this is monday morning quarterback by somebody who is not in the government. but you're asked to testify and i think this is one of the

lessons that we have to learn from the europeans. how they have done. what's missing, it seems is form ain't gration of effort by the governments -- formal integration of effort by the governments, europe and the u.s., that's a decision the trump administration could take which would be helpful. senator collins: i completely agree with you that visibility and transparency are absolutely critical, and that is an important lesson from what happened last fall. ambassador garcevic, i want to ask you about montenegro, because the state of maine has a special relationship with montenegro, i can see by your smile you are ware of that. we're part of the state partnership program and our national guard has members stationed there to assist the military. we like to think we were helpful

getting you ready for your nato ascension which i strongly supported. but montenegro is a really interesting example because russia was not able, despite a tremendous effort, to dissuade the people there from electing a pro-nato government last october. so my question to you is this, why were the russian influence fforts unsuccessful in montenegro, which is a small country that has far closer historical and cultural religious ties to russia, and where the russian state media and propaganda are prevalent even as their efforts appear to be much more successful, that's probably an overstatement, but to have some success in sowing

the seeds of doubt and discord in the 2016 election in our country? ambassador garcevic: that's a very difficult to answer. in a couple minutes. sometimes we're a small country. russia is big. i would say that russia looked down on us as a just peanuts on the bottom that they can put in order easily. but it turned out not to be the case. sometimes we hear simply luck. when one of computers of one or more people in the mission to nato was hacked by russia. simmably because another mission i won't mention names, which had , recommend tack

sterd the attack, that virus even before it started working. then we turned to nato. and then helpful for nato people be checked all computers, not only in the mission to nato, but those in the foreign affairs and ministry of defense and government office and to know that the -- they were not affected. sometimes as i said it's luck. but in more broader terms, i would say that russia didn't penetrate economically, though at the first glance at the surface, many felt us to explain backed russians living there, and russia money pouring in for four years. but actually russia investments in montenegro were mostly

investments in real estate. we're not dependent on energy. russians didn't invest in banking sector. there are no investments in any of our important branches. so they couldn't simply sway us easily. even when we impose sanctions on them, they didn't know how to react economically. so they turned to some political measures in order to assure they are angry because of it. hen i would say government thought we were small. what we tried to do. but equally when it comes to cyberattacks, we're not capable to hit back definitely. but we try to build up to nato partners, and we seek help. then at the end of the day, when it comes to sishe attacks, it's about human factor -- comes to

cyberattacks, it's about human factor. andry to build up vigilance issuing warning signs to its agencies to be careful how to deal with the information. senator kohlins: thank you. chairman burr: senator heinrich. senator heinrich: you talked a lot about the sanctions bill we passed here in the senate. if speaker ryan and the house of representatives doesn't take up that russian sanctions bill, what kind of message do you think that would send to putin? ambassador burns: i think a message of weakness because the senate by a huge margin has teed this up. it's the right thing to do to have a painful type of legislative against the russians. if it's diluted in the house, if the trump administration encourages the house to do that, which is what one hears, then i think the russians will receive a mixed message here, not stiff message which they need to receive. senator heinrich: do you think it will send -- make him more or less likely to interfere in the

2018 and 2020 elections? ambassador burns: i read the trabs script of your hearing with director -- transcript of the hearing with director comey, he told you he thinks it's going to continue until we have better defenses. until we have gone on the offense. i think president trump should consider, maybe secretary tillerson should do this, what president obama did, go to putin directly as president obama did, after our election, and just say there are going to be consequences and spell them out. that's actually probably the most effective thing that the trump administration should do. senator heinrich: should we take these kinds ever cyberattacks and election manipulations as seriously as we would take a military action or an economic threat to our country? ambassador burns: as you know they are different. a military action is immediate. consequential, you have to respond. within hours. i actually think this is -- what

they tried to do systematically to the touch, the french, germans, and americans is discredit democracy in the eyes of our citizens. i use the word exy tension in our testimony. i think it was the right word to tuesday. i think we need to meet this squarely and all of us have suggest add multitude of ways to do that. senator heinrich: i think one of the challenges she's mentioned is that the current president has been unwilling to respond or even acknowledge the validity of the russian hostile actions in the election. i'm curious what that means for what we as members of the senate can or should do to advance a conversation with ourure peaian allies about sanctions -- with urure peaian -- with our european allies. ambassador burns: that conversation has to be held normally in this situation. as you know the state department and white house would be talking to the germans, austrians, about

the consequences of the senate bill. i don't know if this happened this time. but we're in this phase, we talked about the separation of powers for 200 years. my own view the congress needs to play the leading role because i perceive congress to be tougher. senator heinrich: do any of you want to add to that? dr. stelzenmueller: it's well-known that german politicians, senior german politicians, have protested the sanctions bill. and this is, of course, because german companies, not just german companies, otherure peaians as well are invested in north stream, too. i'm not a big fan of this project, frankly. but i'm far more concerned about unilateral american sanctions that aren't discussed with theure peaians, that are put -- with the europeans, that are just put out there. we have for years been asking america to allow the export of

american l and g to the european market, and it had been congress resisting this. i think the lesson of this experience is for us to, as allies, discuss what is in the interest of the alliance and where we can work together. i think that would, again, be a significant importance as a deterrent towards russia. senator heinrich: while i have you, when president trump questioned the value, the relevance of nato, whether we should even keep it as a structure, who do you think benefited most from that? dr. stelzenmueller: i have already said that. that helps the kremlin. it's not great. i also don't think it's in america's self-interest to question that alliance because you have significant interest in europe and in europe's periphery. and the alliance without europeans, helps you pursue those national self-interests. senator heinrich: coy not agree more. mr. sarts, you talked about how

we should take the truth directly to the russian people because of the filter that they receive so much of their information through. how can we cut out putin and speak directly to the russian people? director sarts: i think it is very clear and that is the same environment. which is the digital one. and if one takes note of the recent protest in russia against the corruption, it was very strikingly how young the crowd was. it is also very clear that these people don't any more get their world view from the tv. it's all about social networks. that's the way you can get the truth back to them. i'm sure kremlin will try to put up a new element to block us, but i think that is an environment where we can get back to them. senator heinrich: thank you-all for your testimony today. chairman burr: senator blunt.

senator blunts: thank you, chairman. let's try a yes-no question first in the interest of time. the russian economy is failing. not nearly the country it could or should be. does putin benefit in russia from getting credit for interfering with elections in our countries? ambassador? ambassador burns: i think he does. it builds him up. ambassador garcevic politically, he does. director sarts: it is one significant part of his domestic policy to benefit from it. dr. stelzenmueller: sorry, i can't do a yes or no. i kay's both. and the short term he benefits. in the long-term he loses. and russia loses. senator blunt: the short-term benefit -- slipe validates the narrative that we're -- dr. stelzenmueller: validates the narrative that we're all as bad as russia. the reality is a lot of kremlin

interference has backfired and backfired visibly and we have been learning from that. it has taught us to review our complacencies, it taught us to defend our democracies. that's a good thing. but we also are up against a significant enemy and one that has a lot of energy. senator blunt: in terms -- i was going to ask what we should do about these channels of miscommunication like in our country, sputnik and r.t., what, if ith you, anything, have you done to try to respond or immediately counter dict -- contradict information coming in. you are much closer to this than we're. it's no -- than we are. it's no harder to keep out here than there. dr. stelzenmueller: i arrived here in november of 2014 to work at brookings.

i was stunned by the amount of r.t. commercials -- posters, advertisements around washington. there are these big expensive ones on the back lighted ones on the bus stops, then the one that is were plastered all over construction sites. amazing. i had never seen anything like that. clearly there was a big investment here directed at normal washingtonians. senator blunt: is there no investment like that in germany? dr. stelzenmueller: not the same way. senator blunt: would you allow it if they wanted to do that? dr. stelzenmueller: i tend to think they can -- if they want to buy advertisement, it's a free country. and these are companies. they can do this. i'm not a big fan of nanny state endeavors to protect us from things we can perfectly well see through. and i believe that americans can see through this as well. where it becomes more insidious is where they are doing covert stuff, where they are buying people, institutions. and so i have --

senator blunt: your view is that's mother insidious than fake news. dr. stelzenmueller: fake news sin sidous if our sitens are not media literate. senator blunt: in other countries what do they do about r.t. and other russian outlets? director sarts: in the information spaces, actually quite simple. if somebody doesn't have the credibility, they might message as much as they want, there is no effect from that. i think there is an interesting example where sputnik opened the offices in the scan da naveingian countries, within a year's time they had to close it. nobody would listen to them. senator blunt: what about in montenegro? ambassador garcevic: sputnik has no office there. i barely can remember any of had russian-based media offices there. but they have offices in neighboring serbia and from

there it penetrate montenegro, they know that in the case, government may revoke license at any moment. it is not the case in serbia because we speak more or less same language, they can do it easily. from there their news will be rebroadcasted or reprinted and published. senator blunt: ambassador, what if anything should we do about hese known medians they use of miscommunication? ambassador burns: senator, i think two things. one is always attach an adjective, a couple before. we talked about them. the russian government propaganda station, r.t. expose them for who they are. they are russian government. second, be very careful if you ever go on it because they'll distort what you say. don't give them the platform they want. senator blunts: one more question in to you. i actually agree with your current position on congressionally binding sanctions.

i assume you were much more inclined to have a flexible position when you were at the state department? ambassador burns: absolutely true. i am a creature of the executive branch. i always thought it's better to preserve the president's authority to act. in this particular case, since the president is not acting, i think the congress has to take that responsibility. chairman burr: senator king. senator king: starting with calm comments. one, i want to associate myself with senator rubio's question, which is the real question question -- key question of this hearing. what can we do to defend ourselves? you already testified, talked about it, to submit a written, very short, half a page, binge, binge, binge, heres are five things we can do to defend ourselves. that would be helpful. secondly, what we're seeing here, it seems to me, the is the invention and expansion and implementation of a new kind of warfare. it's the kind of warfare that is particularly effective against

democracy. valley, the chief of the -- valerie, the chief of the general staff of russia, calls it weaponizing information. and said in 2013 that he believes this is -- we're engaged now in informational conflict. putin's defense budget is 1/8th 6 ours, but he is playing a weak hand very well. and has found a cheap way, when i say peculiarly effective against democracies because this is where public opinion matters. in many other countries, public opinion doesn't have that great a role in how policy is formed. a couple of short questions. i think ambassador burns, you just answered this. any doubt that r.t. is an arm of the russian government? no doubt. everybody agrees. secondly, i had heard in a previous hearing, different committee, that the russians were looking around, sniffing around, buying commercial tv outlets in europe. have any of you heard of that?

director sarts: question, there have been in baltic states cases tried. ey but governments have tried to blow up these possibilities. senator king: that certainly seems to me is one of the thing but that we have to watch. another, i think this is a yes or no question, was what was done here in 2016 absolutely coincies tent -- consistent with what the russians have been doing in europe for some years? essentially the same modus operandi? o ahead. director sarts: well, it was. there were a number of new elements and more risk taking. senator king: they are getting more sophisticated? is that accurate? i think, mr. sarts, you said

something several times consistent with my understanding. some members of this committee were in eastern europe over a year ago, in the spring of 2016. we were in ukraine and poland. when we asked them how -- the first thing they wanted to tell us is, watch out for the russians in your elections. we didn't understand how preshant that was at the time. in any case, how do you defend yourself? the answer was, i think exactly what you said. they said the best defense is if the people know what's happening. and they can say, oh, it's just the russians. and that you characterize as societal awareness. that's what i think is one of the most important roles of this committee is to educate the american people that whatever we do, whatever defenses we come up with, this is going to keep happening and the best defense is for them to be, i think you used the word digitally lit ral. i can't recall the term. -- literate. i can't recall the term. we need to understand they are

going to do this and we have to shrug it off. ambassador burns? ambassador burns: i think that's the lesson to learn from what happened to the obama administration. they were caught unawares. it was new. they didn't abbreviate the extent of it. and it was a lack of speed and lack ever transparency. -- lack of transparency. senator king: there last been discussion here. they did release on october 9 a comprehensive memo this was going on. that really listed all the elements that were later listed in the january -- in the heat of the campaign nobody paid much attention to it. and i understand. i think thedy lema they had was do we -- the dilemma they had was do we go public in a big way and put the thumb on the scale in the election? i agree. a more aggressive response would have been appropriate in 2020 hindsight. one thing that hasn't been mentioned too much is the use of

compromise. is that not part of the strategy of a lishes material against candidates they don't like? that has happened in other countries, has it not? dr. stelzenmueller: it's one of the open questions about the 2015 bundestag league whether they were looking for that and found t they had not posted anything yet. that's kind of the james bond version. they may just have done this for the simple purpose of espionage. the point about compromise is often you don't find out because you are not supposed to. senator king: yes, sir. director sarts: compromise has been heavily used typically by ussr. the relative importance has decreased because they have learned actually having one is not always essential. you might make it up. senator king: you don't have to have the data. you can make something up. king kicks dogs every morning. then i'm denying it for the next three months. or much worse.

i want to thank you again for your testimony. this has been very informative. i hope you will give us some written responses about defenses because that's an important role of this committee to prepare ourselves for what everyone has suggested is not a one-off in 2016. it will continue to happen and it will continue to happen on both sides of our political divide in this country. putin is not a republican. he is an opportunist. and the next time this attack could come in the opposite direction, but still a crummings of our democrat 1i -- corruption of our democratcy. thank you. chairman burr: senator lankford. senator lankford: i learned several things today including senator king kicks dogs every morning. i was completely unaware of that. i love him. let me ask this panel a quick question. it goes back to the heart of the question senator king asked. the deter reince. -- deterrence.

what price should russia pay for this type of interference? it's one thing to say we're informing our people. we're trying to do it rapidly. i have heard that from several of you to say the speed of the information, response is exceptionally important. finding cooperation between legitimate media sites that they will actually help identify here's false, here's true. get that out. what price should they pay? let me bring up why. when the russians were cheating and doping their athletes, in a very short period of time russia paid a very big price nor that by their athletes not going to the 2016 olympics. you trained but you doped your athletes and caught for that. it's just within the last 24 hours that their doping authority has even allowed to start testing their athletes again. they have been on suspension that long. they paid a price for that. we would hope it would be a deterrent. what price should they pay for this type of aggression? yes, ma'am. dr. stelzenmueller: this is a really difficult question.

politically, legally, militarily. and the main reason why it's difficult is attribution. even when the intelligence services know how to attribute, they may not want to make that public. that is the largest conundrum we're dealing with here. we may, i think, be looking at a symmetrical retaliation. political, economic, and i think the biggest price that russia can and should pay is failure. failure to undermine us. failure to undermine our democracies. failure to undermine our alliances. that is something we can do. i think it is even more important because it's consistently, remaining vulnerability. that is even more important than the question of retaliation. of course we -- american and german and european officials have been doing this. all the time. is to make it very clear to the russians we know what they are doing. that we want them to stop. and that we have ways of reacting. but the actual legality and

viability of symmetrical reactions is a huge legal and military problem. senator ling ford: one thing you mention -- senator lankford: the export of lng, that was debated in congress. a large part of the conversation, it became about this is about american energy companyings being more profitable while the pure peaians are saying this is about geopolitical power if you don't sell us l.n.g., then the russians can turn the valve on and off and control a part of europe. that became debated long-term here and finally determined yes, we're going to sell l.n.g. now europe has another outlet and russia has competition. it's a benefit to our alliance and long-term connection. other ideas that anyone would share as far as the price russia should pay? director sarts: if i may, actually one of the things that they expect us to talk soft

about these things. that's kind of -- part of their plan. they'll not be direct strong response. i thought when macron met putin and the way he did it was not pleasant experience for putin. so being direct instead of what they thought would be this polite talk. secondly, the machinery there, using against us, is extremely important for kremlin to control their own population. so if we're able to dismantle it, then we actually, as i said, we bring in more troops -- truth into the internal russian discourse. senator lankford: other ideas? ambassador burns: it's a tough question for both president trump as it was for president obama. can we find a pressure point as the integrity of our elections.

that's probably going to be symmetric. ambassador garcevic maybe add a sentence. mention that russia's goal is to drive a wedge between the e.u. and the u.s. one of the things that at the u.n. -- europe must exist and unity between e.u. and he u.s. must remain. on top of what was said. chairman burr: senator manchin. senator manchin: thank all of you for being here. >> you can continue to watch this senate intelligence committee hearing about russian fluence in recent european elections online at c-span.org. we'll leave this for the u.s. house. they a